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NOTES
the seaman is permanently disabled. It appears that the Cox decision
was correctly decided given the present case law. Implications in the
concurring opinion in Cox suggest that the Supreme Court may be
disposed to reach a different result with regard to payments to arrest
deteriorating conditions. While this reading of high court precedents
is subject to question, it does appear that a basis may exist to provide
maintenance and cure in such cases. Expanding the scope of the max-
imum cure rule to allow for treatment of deteriorating disabilities and
the institution of a federal seamen's compensation board would serve
to transform maintenance and cure into a doctrine more equitable for
the seaman and more understandable for all parties concerned.
MICHAEL ABCARIAN
Motor Vehicle Safety--National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act —Definition of Safety-Related Defects under Notice Pro-
visions—Manufacturer's Obligations—United States v. General
Motors Corp. 1 —On September 4, 1968, the National Highway Safety
Bureau (NHSB) 2
 received a letter3 which reported an injury-
producing accident caused by the failure of a General Motors (GM)
product known as the Kelsey-Hayes wheel 4 (Wheels) which had been
installed on many GM pickup trucks. In response to the letter, and in
view of the wide-spread use of the Wheels, 2 the NHSB initiated an in-
vestigation pursuant to section 113(e) of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (NTMVSA) 6 to determine whether
' 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir, 1975).
2
 The NHSB is now the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. See id.
at 426 n.5 & 428.
The letter was sent by consumer advocate Ralph Nader. Id. at 428.
4
 The three-piece 15 X 5.50 Kelsey-Hayes disc wheel was introduced by GM in
the fall of 1959 as an option item. Id. at 427.
A total of 810,000 Wheels were installed on approximately 200,000 of the
321,743 GM trucks manufactured during the 1960-65 model years. M. at 427. It is es-
timated that 50,000 of these trucks have been equipped with campers or special bodies.
Id. at 429.
" National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431
(1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1391 et seq. (Stipp. 1V, 1974). Section I 13(e), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1402(e) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp. IV, 1974), provides:
(e) If through ... investigation ... the Secretary determines that any
motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment ... (2) contains a defect
which relates to motor vehicle safety; then he shall immediately notify the
manufacturer of such motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment of
such defect .... The Secretary shall afford such manufacturer an oppor-
tunity to present his views and evidence .... If after such presentation by
the manufacturer the Secretary determines that such ... item of equip-
ment ... contains a defect which relates to motor safety, the Secretary
shall direct the manufacturer to furnish ... notification ... to the pur-
chaser of such motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment ....
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the Wheels contained a safety-related defect.' Part I of the NHSB's
investigation report (the Report), issued on April 2, 1969, concluded
that safety-related defects existed and that the Wheels should be re-
placed as early as possible. 9 In answer to this report, GM contended
in meetings with NHSB personnel that all failures were caused by
overloading, and denied the existence of any defect. 9 Although GM
maintained its position with respect to the existence of a defect, it
agreed to notify each owner of the danger posed by overloading or
overinflating tires." On May 28, 1969, pursuant to this agreement,
GM began to send notices to 280,000 truck owners."
On August 12, 1969, Part II of the Report was issued and reaf-
firmed the NHSB's initial conclusion that the Wheels contained a
safety-related defect.' 2 The Report rejected GM's overloading theory
on the ground that . "96 percent of all known wheel failures have oc-
curred under loads which are below the design wheel strength level
specified [by GM in the owner's manual] ...." 13 The Report also con-
cluded that GM's May 28th letter of notification was inadequate." On
August 22, 1969, pursuant to section 113(e) of the NTMVSA," the
Federal Highway Administrator informed GM that the existing evi-
dence demonstrated a defect in the Wheels which related to motor
vehicle safety." GM submitted a proposed settlement which contained
an offer to send a second notice reiterating its earlier warnings and to
replace, at GM's expense, any Wheels installed on trucks equipped
with special bodies or campers. On October 8, 1969, the NHSB ac-
cepted the proposal on the condition that the case could be reopened
if necessary in the interest of safety."
The investigation continued with respect to Wheels installed on
those trucks which were not equipped with campers or special bodies
(plain trucks)." Subsequently, Part III of the Report was issued and
7 518 F.2d at 428.
8 1d., quoting NHSB, INVESTIGATION REPORT INVOLVING ALLEGED WHEEL FAILURES,
CHEVROLET AND CMG TRUCKS, pt. I, at 5 (April 2, 1969) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
518 F.2d at 428.
'° Id. at 428-29.
" Id. at 429.
12 Id., citing REPoRT,supra note 8, pt. II (August 12, 1969).
' 3 1d., quoting REPORT„supra note 8, pt. II. at 21-22 (August 12, 1969). NHSB
used a wheel strength of 2369 lbs., derived from GM specification, and added an allow-
ance of fifteen percent for reasonable overload. 518 F.2d at 429 n.22, quoting REPORT,
supra note 8, pt. II, at 13 (August 12, 1969).
" Id., citing REPoa-r.supra note 8, pt. II, at 2, 21-22 (August 12, 1969).
" 15 U.S.C.	 1402(e) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp. IV, 1974).
Section 113(e) is quoted at note 6, supra.
16 518 F.2d at 429.
" Id. Since the October 8, 1969 settlement approximately 66,270 Wheels have
been replaced. Id. GM has received 2,361 reports of actual failures. United States v.
General Motors Corp., 377 F. Supp. 242, 251 (D.D.C. 1974).
In an attempt to spur the investigation, a suit was filed by Ralph Nader. Nader
v. Volpe, Civil No. 960-70 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 31, 1970). The case was remanded to the
NHSB with an order to report to the court by September 17, 1970. 518 F.2d at 429-30.
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revealed ninety-eight Wheel failures on plain trucks."' The NHSB
concluded that a significant number of those failures had occurred on
plain trucks at loads which were below the wheel strength level
specified by GM. 20
 In response, GM submitted a memorandum to the
NHSB stating that both the data and the findings of manufacturing
defects contained in the Report were inaccurate." Nevertheless, on
November 4, 1970, the Director of NHSB reiterated that a defect ex-
isted in the Wheels because they "are subject to sudden and cata-
strophic failures resulting in an unreasonable risk of accident, death,
and injuries to persons using the highways." 22 Pursuant to sections
113(c) and 113(e) of the NTMVSA, the Director of the NHSB or-
dered GM to furnish defect notices to owners of the plain trucks.23
GM, however, refused to comply with this order, maintaining that the
Wheels contained no defects relating to motor vehicle safety and that
any failures in performance of the Wheels were due to owner abuse."
On November 6, 1970, the Government brought suit for the en-
forcement of its order in federal district court, 22
 alleging that GM had
failed to furnish notification of a defect relating to motor vehicle
safety in violation of section 108(a)(4) of the NTMVSA. 2° The district
court granted the Government's motion for summary Judgment on
the ground that a defect could be established merely by proving a
large number of failures in performance. 27 The court expressly
agreed with the Government's. theory that the cause of such failures is
irrelevant to the determination of the existence of a defect 28 because,
1 " 518 F.2d at 430, citing REPoicr.sitpra note 8, pt. I II, at 3, 18 (Sept. 3, 1970).
" 518 F.2d at 430, quoting REPORT, supra note 8, pt. III, at 3, 18 (September 3,
1970). This 1960-65 owners' manuals specified GVW's (Gross Vehicle Weight, or max-
imum load capacity) for three different tube tires of' 5500, 6000 and 6700 lbs. 518 F.2d
at 427-28. It was not specified that any of these were the GVW's for Kelsey-Hayes
Wheels. Id. at 428. The Wheels combined with these tires had tire-wheel capacities of
1520, 1800 and 2060 lbs., respectively. Thus, if an owner multiplied these last weights
by four, an inaccurate, inflated GVW would result. In addition, GM permanently of
 a GVW plate which stated that the GVW was 7500 lbs. Id. at 445. Included in the
Report were ten failures at less than 1520 lbs. and fifty-two failures at less than 2060
lbs. Id. at 420 n.29.
21 518 F.2d at 430.
22 id,
"Id. That same day GM filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware. General Motors v. Volpe, 321
F. Supp. 1112 (D. Del. 1970), affd as modified, 457 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1972). The district
court refused to exercise its jurisdiction and GM was remitted to present its challenges
as defenses in the GovernMent enforcement action in the District of Columbia. 518
F.2d at 430.
24
 518 F.2d at 430.
23 id,
28
 15 U.S.C. § 1397(a)(4) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1397(a)(1)(D), 1411-16
(Supp. IV, 1974). Sections 1397 and 1402 of the 1966 statute have been amended with
little substantive change except for the new requirement that the manufacturer remedy
defects at no cost.
22
 United States v. General Motors Corp., 377 F. Supp. 242, 249 n.20 (D.D.C.
1974). The Government submitted 160 affidavits showing 436 failures. 518 F.2d at 430.
28 377 F. Supp. at 249 & si.20.
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in the court's view, that theory was supported by the statutory lan-
guage and purpose, and the administrative interpretation of the
NHSB." The court rejected GM's contention that Congress intended
to adopt a common law definition of defect which allowed a defense
of owner abuse. 3°
GM appealed the district court's conclusion to the United States
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, which reversed the district
court and HELD: (I) a safety-related defect under section 113(e) of
the NTMVSA is prima facie established if a significant number of
failures resulting from actual operation are demonstrated," and (2)
the manufacturer may rebut such a prima facie case by proving that
the failures were caused by gross and unforeseeable owner abuse or
by unforeseeable neglect of vehicle maintenance." The court
reasoned that the inclusion of a gross abuse and unforeseeable neglect
of maintenance defense was compelled by the "commonsense" balanc-
ing of safety and economic costs sought by Congress,33 and by the
administrative agency's recognition that the cause of failure is in fact
relevant to the existence of a defect. 34 Since genuine issues of material
fact concerning GM's affirmative defense existed on the record, the
case was remanded to the district court. 35
The significance of the General Motors Corp. decision was well
stated by the court in the opening sentence of its opinion: "This case
represents the first appellate examination of the defect notification
provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966."" This note will examine the General Motors Corp. decision by
focusing on the factors relied upon by the court to support its hold-
ing. As part of this examination, the legislative history of the
NTMVSA and the court's application of that history to the definition
of a safety-related defect will be reviewed. In addition, the circuit
court's analysis of the administrative interpretation of the NTMVSA
will be examined for its effect upon the definition of a safety-related
defect. It will be suggested that both the legislative history and ad-
ministrative interpretation suggest a conclusion in contrast to that of
the circuit court and that gross abuse should not be a defense to the
defect notification requirement of the NTMVSA. The note will con-
clude by analyzing the standards established by the court for the def-
inition and implementation of the gross abuse defense.
" 377 F. Supp. at 248-50. In a Memorandum and Order, the court also ordered
GM to pay $100,000 in civil penalties pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1398 (1970), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 1398 (Supp. IV, 1974). United States v. General Motors Corp., 385 F.
Supp. 598, 605 (D.D.C. 1974).
38 377 F. Supp. at 249.
3$ 518 F.2d at 427.
32
 Id.
33 Id. at 435-36.
"Id. at 437.
35 1d. at 427.
38 Id. at 425.
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Section 113 of the NTMVSA provides that a manufacturer of
motor vehicles must notify purchasers of all defects relating to motor
vehicle sqlety. 37 Defect, as defined in section 102(11), includes "any de-
fect in performance, construction, components or materials in motor
vehicles ... . "38 The Government argued that a defect could be estab-
lished merely by proving a large number of failures in performance. 39
GM, on the other hand, contended that Congress intended to adopt
the common law definition of defect which requires a showing that
product failures were not caused by owner abuse. 40 Specifically, GM
contended that unless the vehicle was being used in conformity with
the manufacturer-provided owner's Manual, any failures in perfor-
mance did not constitute defects within the meaning of section
102(I 1). 41
The .district court adopted the definition urged by the Govern-
ment, reasoning that the language of the NTMVSA notification provi-
sion, read in light of the definitional provision in section 102(11), is
unambiguous.'" In the district court's view, this language, coupled
with the statutory purpose of reducing traffic accidents" forcefully
demanded that notice be sent whenever a significant number of fail-
ures in performance occur, regardless of cause."
The circuit court rejected both the Government's definition and
GM's definition. The court first concluded that a failure in perfor-
mance alone could establish a defect." This conclusion gave rise to
the core issue of whether the cause of the failure is relevant to the de-
termination of whether a defect was established. The court found that
neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of the
NTMVSA answered this question. 49 Nonetheless, GM's contention
that the common law definition of defect should be applied was
rejected. 47 The court also rejected the Government's interpretation,
which would have entirely eliminated cause as an element in the de-
termination of a defect. Instead, the court found causation to be rel-
37 15 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1411 (Supp. IV, 1974),
provides that a manufacturer must furnish notification of any defect which it deter-
mines in good faith relates to motor vehicle safety. 15 U.S.C. § 1402(h),(d) (1970), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1411, 1413 (Supp. IV, 1974), provides that the notice be sent
within a reasonable time and that it contain a clear description of the defect and the
measures necessary for repair. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1402 (e)(1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1412 (Stipp. IV, 1974) (quoted at note 6 supra), the Secretary, after an investigation
and presentation of evidence, may require that notice be sent.
"" 15 U.SC. § 1391(11) (1970).
" 518 F.2d at 430.
4 " Id. at 431. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ()Vila,: LAW OF TORTS 667-71 (4th
ed. 1971),
41 518F.2dat434.
377 F. Supp. at 249.
* 3 See 15 U.S.C. § 138 I (1970).
44 377 F. Supp. at 249 & n.20.
4 ' 518 F.2d at 432.
" Id. at 132-33.
47 Id. at 433-35.
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evant in light of the subsequent legislative history and the administra-
tive interpretation," and concluded that a defense of gross abuse by
the owner could negate the establishment of a defect. The court then
established standards for proving a defect in performance, creating a
rebuttable presumption when a significant number of failures have
occurred and drawing a distinction between failures in parts designed
to last the life of the car and failures in parts which are meant to be
replaced
In rejecting the common law meaning of defect, the court
reasoned that the statutory liabilities created by the NTMVSA were
intended by Congress to be separate from and unaffected by the
common law liabilities which previously existed." Section 108(c) ex.-
pressly provides that compliance with the NTMVSA does not exempt
any person from liability under common law. 5 ' Remarks by Represen-
tative Dingell which noted that the NTMVSA preserved all common
law remedies that exist against a manufacturer, were used as addi-
tional support for the court's differentiation between the common law
and NTMVSA standards. 52 The court concluded that the NTMVSA
was "supplementary of and in addition to the common law of negli-
gence and product liability." 53 Thus, common law definitions could
not be used to define a defect under the statute.
GM alternatively contended that defect should be given its "or-
dinary" meaning, and that given this meaning a defect could be found
only where equipment fails to operate properly when used in accor-
dance with applicable instructions and warnings." The court rejected
this contention on the ground that Congress, in enacting the
NTMVSA, was concerned with the myriad conditions experienced by
the public in the day-to-day use of their vehicles. 55 The narrow in-
terpretation urged by GM—having at its foundation test data com-
piled by manufacturers on the manufacturers' proving grounds or
performance specifications derived under laboratory conditions—was
not consistent with this broad congressional concern.
To support this finding the court quoted many excerpts from
contemporary congressional debates and hearings." These quotations
indicate that Congress intended that the NTMVSA provide protection
through an added margin of safety, which would encompass the
"owner who is lackadaisical, who neglects regular maintenance, and
" Id. at 435-37.
49 Id. at 437-39.
"Id.
51
 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (Stipp. IV, 1974).
52 518 F.2d at 434 n.61, poling 112 Cong. Rec. 19663 (1966) (remarks of Rep-
resentative Dingell).
53 518 F.2d at 434, quoting Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 506
(8th Cir. 1968) (dictum).
" 518 F.2d at 434.
U.
56 1d. at 434 n.63.
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doesn't switch his tires, doesn't keep them at proper pressure ...." 57
The court also rejected GM's theory on the basis of GM's own descrip-
tion of the manner in which purchasers normally operate their trucks.
During the NHSB proceedings, GM's counsel had admitted: "We
know, we always have known, everybody knows that trucks are over-
loaded on occasion." 56 The court also cited a 1969 letter by GM to the
Federal Highway Administrator which stated that "[On the case of
trucks ... the applicable GVW can be exceeded easily and will be ex-
ceeded unless the operator takes precautions against so doing ....
[O]wners have continued and will continue to exceed these
limitations."59 The court concluded that "[t]tle reality of day-to-day
operation embraces some to-be-expected overloading of the vehicle
and overinflating of the tires, and this provides the proper context in
which to evaluate vehicle performance." 6 ° Since the GM standard,
based on "applicable instructions and warnings," did not embrace
owner misconduct which was either commonplace or which could
reasonably be anticipated, that standard was rejected for its overly-
narrow outlook.
The court next rejected the definition urged by the
Government—that a defect is established merely by proving a sig-
nificant number of failures in performance, and that the cause of
such failures is irrelevant."' This is the most important section of the
court's opinion because it served as a -basis for the court's final deter-
mination that the cause of a failure in performance does in fact have
relevance in the determination of a defect. Three reasons were cited
by the court for the rejection of the Government's definition: (1) the
definition is inconsistent with the "commonsense" approach in inter-
preting the NTMVSA, (2) the definition is contrary to the legislative
history of subsequent amendments to the NTMVSA, and (3) the def-
inition is contrary to the "case by case" standard announced by the
Secretary on several prior occasions. 62
The scope of the NTMVSA is delimited by the definition of
motor vehicle safety, which is defined in section 102(1) as the perfor-
mance of motor vehicles in such a manner that the public is protected
against unreasonable risk of death or injury in the event accidents
occur. 6 " The inclusion of the "unreasonable" qualification in the
NTMVSA definition of motor vehicle safety was, the court reasoned,
" Hearings on Traffic Safely Bdive the Senate Commerce Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
160 (1966) (remarks by Senator Hartke) [hereinafter cited as Traffic Safety Hcarings],
Senator Magnuson spoke of the need for protection for a driver whose conduct might
be outside the law: "even if he was speeding, wasn't cautious . . . even people who are
not cautious can be protected." Id. at 252.
58
 518 F,2d at 434.
" Letter from J.C. Bates, Director, GM Service Section to Francis C. Turner,
Federal Highway Administrator, Sept. 11, 1969, at 4-5, quoted in 518 F.2d at 434-35.
° 518 F.2d at 435.
"' Id.
63 Id. at 435-37.
63 15 U.S.C. 1391(1) (1970). See S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong„ 2d Sess, 5 (1966).
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indicative of a congressional intent that the NTMVSA be adminis-
tered with a "commonsense" approach." For example, manufacturers
cannot be required to produce vehicles and parts which never wear
out or never require maintenance: such parts as tires and lights can-
not be termed defective if they fail due to age or wear. Similarly, a
defect cannot be found when a wheel collapses under an unforesee-
able overload.sa The court thus concluded: "The District Court's deci-
sion that a large number of failures, regardless of cause, constituted
irrebuttable proof of a 'defect,' ignores these commonsense limitations
and must be rejected as incompatible with the discernible legislative
intention." 66
It is submitted that the circuit court's analysis of the common-
sense approach omits an important distinction. The congressional dis-
cussion of the commonsense approach took place before the notifica-
tion provision was included in the bill." The court fails to recognize
that with respect to this separately added and discussed provision, the
commonsense approach was intended not to apply, and in fact has no
legitimacy. The commonsense approach was intended to have effect
in the determination of whether the manufacturer, in producing the
vehicle at the outset, had the ability to avoid a failure. 68
 Where a
manufacturer could be said to have such an ability, it would clearly be
required to recall and repair the defect, at its own expense. However
legitimate the commonsense approach might be in determining
whether a manufacturer is liable for repairs, it is submitted that the
notice provision is not susceptible to the same approach. Once a sig-
nificant number of failures has occurred, it is apparent that serious in-
jury is or may be the result of a failure to notify immediately those
who possess vehicles in which the failure exists. In the notice provi-
sion, the emphasis therefore should not be on the attribution of fault,
but rather on the protection of all motor vehicle operators. For this
reason, the "commonsense" approach should not operate in the notice
provision. In view of the different times at which these provisions
were discussed, it is unlikely that Congress intended such a result.
Thus it appears that the commonsense approach, at least as defined
by the court, should not have been applied in interpreting the notifi-
cation provisions.
Additional evidence supporting the argument that the general
commonsense approach has no application to the notice provision is
that Congress has arguably provided another sort of commonsense
approach for that provision: one section of the NTMVSA permits the
" 518 F.2d at 435. See Traffic Safely Hearings, supra note 57, at 56.
65 518 F.2d at 435.
66 1d. at 436.
87
 The word "unreasonable" as the embodiment of the commonsense approach
was discussed by the Senate on March 16, 1966, Traffic Safety Hearings, supra note 57, at
56. The amendment requiring notification was introduced by Senator Mondale on
April 18, 1966. 518 F.2d at 433.
68
 518 F.2d at 435, quoting S. 121-x. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966).
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NHSB Administrator to use his discretion in exempting a manufac-
turer from either notice or remedy if a defect is inconsequential as it
relates to safety."
Moreover, even if the cost and feasibility limitations embodied in
the commonsense approach are applied to the instant case they do not
bar a requirement of notice. It is obviously economically feasible to
provide wheels which do not collapse without incurring prohibitive
costs, since GM has already done so.'" Thus, it would seem that
whether or not the commonsense approach as enunciated by the court
applies to the notification provision, on these facts GM should have
been required to extend notice to the affected Wheel owners under
section I13(a).
The court further supported its conclusion that the cause of a
failure is relevant by analyzing the legislative history of subsequent
amendments to the NTMVSA. 71 The 1974 amendments" to the
NTMVSA require manufacturers to remedy safety-related defects at
their own expense." The accompanying House Report, issued one
" 15 U.S.C. § 1417 (Supp. IV, 1974).
'" GM replaced 62,229 Wheels in accordance with the agreement of October 7,
1969. 377 F. Supp. at 246. GM has also provided a 16" wheel as a possible replacement
which increases the rear wheel load-carrying ability by 20% within the same GVW. Id.
at 245 n.7,
71 518 F.2d at 436. This discussion was qualified by the court's admonition that
subsequent legislative history was pertinent but hazardous. Id. The circuit court cited
several cases including one with a statutory change which paralleled the change in the
instant case. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304 (1960). In Price, the Supreme Court
discussed the unacceptability of drawing an inference that a change in one provision of
a statute compels any change in interpreting other provisions. The Court stated that
"views of a subsequent Congress fbrrn a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one." Id. at 313. See also United States v.. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157,
170 (1967); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 382 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1973); cf. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n.4 (1967),
where the Court stated that although "itihe views of a subsequent Congress , .. provide
no controlling basis from which to infer the purpose of an earlier Congress....
[n]onetheless, [those views are] pertinent ...." The Haynes case can be distinguished
from the instant case because the subsequent history being used in Haynes was a discus-
sion by a later Congress of what that Congress thought the congressional intent behind
the original enactment was. Id. In the instant case, the subsequent history being used is
in the form of amendments to the original Act.
Nonetheless, the court in the instant case appears to have ignored its own ad-
monition by giving the subsequent history great weight. The court's analysis of contem-
porary legislative history concluded with a finding that such history offered no answer
to the meaning of defect. The only evidence cited by the court in support of its holding
that a gross abuse defense was allowed to a finding of a defect was the House Report
issued in 1974. See H.R. REP, No. 1191, 93d Cong., 2(1 Sess. (1974).
"Section 111(a)(1) of the NTMVSA provides: "If notification is required ...
then the manufacturer ... shall cause such defect ... to be remedied without charge."
15 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974). Section 102(b) of the NTMVSA was also
amended in 1974 and now provides: "(b) If ... the Secretary determines that such ve-
hicle or item of replacement equipment ... contains a defect which relates to motor ve-
hicle safety, the Secretary shall order the manufacturer (1) to furnish notification ..
and (2) to remedy such defect ...." 15 U.S.C. § 1412(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
" 518 F.2d at 436.
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month after the district court opinion, indicated that this remedy
without charge requirement was not intended to operate where the
manufacturer "can establish that the condition requiring correction
results from the abuse of their products or the failure to adequately
maintain them." 74 The fact that Congress permitted an abuse defense
in the remedy without charge section was important to the court in
answering the question of whether the defense should be included in
the notice section, because "the contours of the defects the manufac-
turer must remedy fairly delineate the defects that must be
notified. " 75 The House Report, in the court's view, supported the
conclusion that the contours of the notice and remedy provisions were
coterminous. 76 Thus, the court adopted the somewhat simplistic
reasoning that (I) if the manufacturer must remedy a defect and pro-
vide notice for a defect, and (2) if the defect which he must remedy is
qualified by an abuse defense, then (3) the same qualification should
apply to a defect for which the manufacturer must provide notice.
It is clear that the House Report relied upon by the court does
not state or imply that abuse is a defense to notification. The Report
says only that manufacturers need not make corrections if the cause of
the defect is owner abuse." For this reason, the court did not use the
report directly to interpret the notification provision. Instead, the
court used the report to interpret the word "defect" in the remedy
provision; then, by reason of the claimed coterminous nature of the
remedy and notice obligations, it applied this interpretation to the
notification provision." However, if Congress had intended this lan-
guage to apply to the notice section it could easily have said so.
Moreover, the House Report allows the abuse defense only to the
remedy obligation and it does not discuss the interpretation which
should be given to the term "defect."
It is also important to note that the House Report speaks only of
an abuse defense to the remedy without charge requirement. The
court not only extends this to the notice section but also ipse dixit
qualifies the defense as a gross abuse defense instead of a mere abuse
defense. Thus, the court defied its own finding of coterminous
parameters for the notice and remedy provisions by allowing different
standards of defense to notice and remedy."
On close examination, it is doubtful that the notification and
remedy without charge sections were intended to afford parallel pro-
tections. The court acknowledged one exception to the coterminous
74 H,R. REP. No. 1191, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974).
75 518 F.2d at 437. The court stated that "Congress was making clear ... that the
defects required to be notified were defects that would have to be repaired at the ex-
pense of the manufacturer not at the expense of the consumer." Id. at 436-37.
76 /d. at 437.
77 H.R. REP. No. 1191, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974).
78 518 F.2d at 437,
" The court may be requiring the more stringent defense to notice because of
the added margin of safety discussed in the contemporary legislative history.
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treatment, but dismissed it as having "no present consequence." 8°
That exception removed the obligation to repair defects covered by
notices issued eight years after the first purchase.' It is submitted,
however, that the court either ignored or overlooked another "excep-
tion" to the coterminous treatment of the notice and repair
provisions. 82 The court discussed the provision in a footnote in the
following manner: "[this provision] ... contains exceptions from both
the notice and remedy obligations where the Secretary determines ...
[that the defect is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle
safety]."83 The import of this provision is that by its terms the Secre-
tary has the discretion to treat notice and remedy obligations
separately. Thus, it is .questionable whether the Act contemplates a con-
sistent treatment of notice and repair provisions in light of these
rather significant exceptions.
The distinction between the notice and remedy without charge
requirements is further supported in a section of the 1974 House Re-
port not quoted by the court. That section specifies: "A court order is
required to remove the manufacturer's statutory obligation to
remedy without charge once notification is required to be issued ...."84
Thus, the removal of an obligation to repair does not automatically
remove an obligation to notify.
The court found additional congressional recognition of the
coterminous treatment to be accorded the notice and remedy provi-
sions in a 1974 amendment which provided for provisional notifica-
tion during litigation under the NTMVSA. 85 In the court's view, this
amendment recognized the tension which would result from the com-
peting considerations of litigating an abuse defense and the need for
prompt notification. It is submitted, however, that the tension alluded
to by Congress could arise whether or not an abuse defense was ap-
plicable to the notice provision. Any litigation would create a tension
between the manufacturer's right to a hearing and the owner's need
to be promptly notified. For example, GM could litigate the issue of
whether a significant number of failures had actually occurred. Thus,
although the provisional notice section is clearly a congressional rec-
ognition of some form. of tension between competing claims, it does
not follow that Congress specifically contemplated an abuse defense as
one of those claims.
In conclusion, it appears that the subsequent legislative history
does not support application of a causation requirement to a determi-
nation that notification of a defect must be sent. The congressional in-
tent to impose such limitations has not been clearly demonstrated by
reference to the House Report on the 1974 amendments, the eight
8° 518 F.2d at 437.
s' 15 U.S.C. 11414(b)(4) (Supp. IV, 1974).
82
 15 U.S.C. 11417 (Supp, IV, 1974).
" 518 F.2d at 436 n.72 (emphasis added).
" H.R. REP, No. 1191, supra note 77, at 25.
85 518 F.2d at 437.
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year old vehicle exception, or the provisional notice section. Thus,
neither the contemporary nor subsequent legislative history supports a
reading of the NTMVSA as requiring a gross abuse defense—or, for
that matter, any abuse defense—to notification of a safety related de-
fect.
The court lastly supported its conclusion concerning the rele-
vance of causation by reference to prior statements by the administra-
tive agency concerning the definition of defect. The district court had
concluded that the position asserted by the Government counsel at
trial was the "administrative interpretation."" In considering this in-
terpretation, the court followed the principle "that Courts should give
weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted
by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute." 87
 The
district court was criticized by the circuit court, however, for equating
the position of Government counsel with the administrative interpre-
tation of the NTMVSA." Prior agency announcements were cited as
inconsistent with the Government's present position. For example, the
court pointed to the agency's announcement in the Federal Register
refusing to adopt a definitional rule regarding defect determinations
and stating that defect would be defined on a case by case basis." The
court also referred to a statement by Administrator Toms before the
Senate Commerce Committee. In that statement, the Administrator
said that section 113 of the NTMVSA does not extend to "safety
problems such as worn brakes or tires that occur in any aging vehicle
as a result of normal wear and tear."" On the basis of these pro-
nouncements, the court concluded that the Government's present po-
sition was inconsistent with its prior position and that under its prior
position the cause of a failure is relevant to the determination of a
defect."
It is submitted that the evidence adduced by the court relative to
the administrative interpretation does not require a defense of gross
abuse to the notice obligation. There is no conclusive evidence that
the agency is in disagreement with government counsel in this litiga-
tion. During the agency's investigation, data was compiled without
reference to the loading history of individual trucks equipped with
Wheels. 92 Thus, the agency did not consider load history (cause) as
relevant to the finding of a defect. Second, the court's apparent use of
the agency's third investigative report as a statement of the adminis-
9" 377 F. Supp. at 250.
" 7 518 F.2d at 437, citing 377 F. Supp. at 250, quoting Investment Co. Instit. v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1970).
99 518F.2dat437.
69 38 Fed. Reg. 9509, 9510 (1973).
90 Hearings on Auto Safety Repairs at No Cast, Before the Senate Commerce Comm., 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973) (statement of Douglas W. Toms, Administrator, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration).
91
 518 F.2d at 437.
92
 See note 20 supra.
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trative interpretation of the statute is a distortion due to the facts sur-
rounding the production of that report. The report was produced in
answer to a conditional settlement agreement." GM had agreed to
reiterate earlier warnings regarding overloading and overinflating and
to replace at GM's expense any Wheels on trucks equipped with
campers or special bodies." The proposal was accepted on condition
that the investigation could be reopened in the interest of safety. The
agency subsequently determined that plain trucks were also experienc-
ing failures." 5
 Thus, the agency report referred only to failures occur-
ring below the manufacturer-specified wheel strength levels, 9" first,
because this was the class which had not yet received notification of
safety-related defects and second, because the discovery of failures in
this class was the condition for reopening the settlement agreement.
The report was not meant to be an agency interpretation of the
NTMVSA.
It also appears that the court's reliance on the statement of Ad-
ministrator Toms to demonstrate the relevance of cause in the deter-
mination of a defect is similarly misplaced. While testifying at hear-
ings on the 1974 amendments requiring remedy without charge, the
Administrator suggested that safety problems of concern to section
113 of the NTMVSA did not include those relating to normal wear
and tear found in any aging vehicle."' The circuit court conveniently
ended its reference to the statement of the Administrator before his
next remark that a reasonable cut off point for remedy without cost
"would be vehicles that are more than six years old at the time of
notification."" Thus, a reasonable construction of the Administrator's
entire testimony is that the notification requirement continues despite
the absence of the no-cost remedy. As noted earlier," the lack of con-
gruency in the two sections strengthens the argument that notification
does not include an abuse defense.
Other agency announcements are consistent with the
Government's position at the trial. During the course of the pre-trial
investigations, the Administrator sent a letter to GM stating that a de-
termination of a defect had been made and ordered that notification
be sent to the owners of trucks equipped with Wheels.'" The letter
spoke only of the unreasonable risk of injury resulting from failure of
the Wheels. Therefore, both the agency's interpretation of the statute
and its conduct under these facts does not appear to permit any abuse
"3 518 F.2d at 429.
"'Id.
'' Id. at 429-30. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
"6 See 518 F.2d at 430 n.29 and accompanying text.
"Hearings on Auto Safety Repairs at No Cost, Before the Senate Commerce Comm., 93d
Cong., lst Sess. 9 (1973) (statement by Douglas W. Toms, Administrator, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration).
"" Id. (emphasis added).
"See text at note 80 supra.
11''See text at note 22 supra.
675
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
defense to the requirement of notification when failures involving an
unreasonable risk of injury have been established. Thus, the agency's
refusal to define defect, and the Administrator's statement before the
Commerce Committee do not adequately support the court's conclu-
sion that the NTMVSA requires a gross abuse defense to the re-
quirement of notification of a safety-related defect.
Nonetheless, the court's holding that a gross abuse defense is
applicable to the determination of a defect necessitates an examina-
tion of the standards established for proving the defense. In an en-
forcement proceeding under the NTMVSA, where the government
proves the existence of a significant number of failures and negates
age and wear and tear as causes, a presumption that the failures oc-
curred under foreseeable conditions will arise. In any case where the
relevant component is designed to function for the entire life of the
vehicle, the government will discharge its burden of proof by showing
a significant (non-de minims) number.of failures.'" As an affirmative
defense, the manufacturer may establish that "the failures were at-
tributable to gross and unforeseeable owner abuse or unforeseeable
neglect of vehicle maintenance." 102 However, proof of a significant
number of failures on vehicles operated within the manufacturer's
specifications, or within non-gross departures from those specifica-
tions, would avert trial on the issue of defect.'"
In the court's view, this procedure will operate to effectuate the
policy of creating a "practical and efficient" administration of the de-
fect notification provision.'" Although the court rejected GM's con-
tention that manufacturer specifications were the limitation for pro-
tected owner usage, the court's standard for the gross abuse defense
in fact relieves the manufacturer from the obligation to notify if
owner usage significantly departs from those manufacturer specifica-
tions. The protection afforded by the notice provision therefore ap-
plies only to those drivers complying with the manufacturer's specifi-
cations plus those within a small margin of deviation from those
specifications.
The court's holding will require the NHSB both to compile
owner use data although a significant number of failures are reported
and to support any finding of defect with evidence that failures oc-
curred within manufacturer specifications or non-gross departures
from those specifications. Under this holding, manufacturers can chal-
lenge an NHSB order to notify of failures on at least two grounds: (I)
that a significant number of failures has not occurred, and (2) that
101 518 F.2d at 438 & n.84. Factors to be considered in determining if a signifi-
cant number of failures have occurred are the failure rate of the component in ques-
tion, failure rates of comparable components and the importance of the component to
the safe operation of the vehicle. The number need not be a substantial percentage of
the total number of components produced in order to be considered significant. Id.
102 1d. at 438.




NHSB evidence does not prove that a significant number of failures
occurred within manufacturer specifications or a non-gross deviation
therefrom, either because (a) load data collected is inadequate or (b)
the NHSB's contention that any deviation was non-gross is unsup-
ported by the evidence. It is doubtful that this scheme will lead to an
efficient administration of the NTMVSA, since it appears more likely
to lead to litigation based on manufacturer challenges to NHSB or-
ders to notify of failures. These manufacturers might balance the cost
of litigation against the cost of undermining their consumer relations,
and opt for the former.
CONCLUSION
The circuit court in General Motors Corp. has misinterpreted the
intended impact of the defect notification provision of the NTMVSA.
There is no support in the contemporary or subsequent legislative his-
tory nor the administrative interpretation of the statute for the posi-
tion that a gross abuse defense must be allowed once the Adminis-
trator has determined that a significant number of safety related de-
fects exist. The statutory purpose of prompt notification vindicating
the owner's right to know of the hazards involved in defective motor
vehicles"' cannot be fulfilled if a significant number of failures can
occur without immediate provision of notice. The gross abuse defense
also frustrates the broad statutory purpose of reducing motor vehicle
accidents on the highways. Only by requiring that notice be provided
in all cases where a significant number of failures in performance
have been established, will 'these purposes for which the NTMVSA
was enacted be effectuated.
JUDY L. CHESSER
I" During debate on the NTMVSA notice provision, Senator Mondale stated
that, "drivers of ... defective cars have a right to know they are riding around in booby
traps. And to fail to warn them is to force them to play Russian roulette without their
knowing so .... 1 do know something about the rights of consumers. Perhaps their
most basic right is the right to know what hazards are associated with a particular prod-
uct." 112 CONG. REC. 8216 (1966).
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